



A Lesson in the Rule of Law

Greek Americans and the Turkish Arms Embargo (1974-1978)

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(These reflections on Cyprus and Greek American political activism in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion, are based on the recent work of Van Coufoudakis and Serge Hadji, presented in *The Rule of Law Lobby: Grass Roots Mobilization and the U.S. Arms Embargo on Turkey, 1974-1978. A Chronology and Bibliography*. Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, Inc. 2017. Pp. 500. 50 Illustrations. 3 Maps. Annotated Bibliography Appendix. Index. Paper.)

On October 8, 1974, the US Congress took an unprecedented step in the annals of American foreign policy and voted for the imposition of an embargo of arms on Turkey, a NATO member and one of the closest American allies. Congress reasoned that by employing American arms in the invasion of the Republic of Cyprus (July 20, 1974), Turkey was in violation of the “rule of law.” American law prohibits the use of US supplied arms for aggressive purposes. The catalyst for imposing the embargo has been the phenomenal Greek American mobilization aimed at influencing Congress.

There have been numerous books and a multitude of articles written about the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the occupation of its northern part, the international dynamics at work, and the Greek American mobilization in the aftermath of the invasion. Enriching this bibliography is a new book: *The Rule of Law Lobby: Grass Roots Mobilization and the U.S Arms Embargo on Turkey, 1974-1978* edited by Van Coufoudakis and Serge Hadji (Hadji-Mihaloglou).

The exceptional value of Coufoudakis’ and Hadji’s book is that both were key participants and keen observers of the tumultuous developments of that period, each from their vantage point. Coufoudakis is a prominent academic. He is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Dean Emeritus of Arts and Sciences at Indiana-Purdue University. He has been an astute observer of Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics and has unrivalled credentials in the study of the Cyprus dispute, having published several acclaimed books and plethora of articles. Coufoudakis has been an activist for Cyprus since the early 1960s and played a prominent role in the mobilization. On September 24, 1974, he testified before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Hadji is a New York-

based lawyer and community organizer. With New York as the epicenter, he emerged as a leading figure in the grass roots mobilization in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and thereafter. In this regard, he was co-founder of the Panhellenic Emergency Committee, known as the Panhellenic Committee. As a lawyer, Hadji was instrumental in the composing of petitions towards the effort to imposing the Congressional embargo. Both Coufoudakis and Hadji have been affiliated with AHI since its founding in August 1974. They both played a very prominent role in the movement that spearheaded Greek American lobbying in Washington. Their professional expertise, combined with their political activism, renders them uniquely qualified to provide a most authoritative account of the emergence of the Greek American community as a political force with the mobilization of 1974-1978 serving as a catalyst.

The book revolves around a Chronology of daily events: From the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, to the Greek American mobilization that led to the Congressional embargo of arms on Turkey in October 1974, to the mobilization against the lifting of the embargo by the Carter administration in August 1978. A “daily event” is perhaps a misnomer. During a particular day, a number of events, sometimes 10 or 15, took place at a different time, different places and different continents. These events amounting to several thousand, are summarized in the Chronology on a daily basis. Considering that the Chronology pertains to a huge number of events related to the Greek American mobilization, developments in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus especially, my review article is not conventional. To a considerable degree, the narrative follows the events in the order they took place. By necessity, out of thousands of events, there has been a selection of the *relatively* more important. The narrative dwells on the significance of these events and their implications. The date(s) of many of these events and developments appear in parenthesis. The purpose is to demonstrate the sequence of connected events, e.g. (Chronology: Aug. 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 1974; Sep. 8, 9, 1974).

The Rule of Law Lobby consists of an Introduction, Chronology, Illustrations, Bibliography and Annotations. Both of the editors wrote the Introduction. The Chronology represents the work of Hadji, a prime participant observer of the mobilization, and includes annotations by AHI founder, Eugene Rossides. The Illustrations derive from Hadji’s rich archive. There are 64 illustrations that include: photographs, posters and fliers of the mobilization, copies of petitions, telegrams and letters to members of Congress, copies of full page ads in the *New York Times*, fundraising appeals for Greek American and philhellene members of Congress, and photographs on the plight of Cypriot refugees. These illustrations provide powerful visual impressions of the mobilization in its varied forms and offer a more tangible evidence of its scope. The Bibliography was compiled and annotated by Coufoudakis. It is based on his long experience and extraordinary academic credentials with regard to the Cyprus dispute.

As such, the Bibliography serves as guide to further research on the phenomenon of Greek American mobilization and the embargo episode.

The July 1974 Cyprus Crisis and its Aftermath

The Rule of Law Lobby focuses on the sequence of events and developments associated with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and its aftermath that in turn led to the Greek American mobilization. These events are presented in chronological order, starting July 20, 1974, the day Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus, and ending September 26, 1978. By that time, the Carter administration had lifted the Arms Embargo and military aid to Turkey was resumed. Considering that the Chronology provides a daily account of the mobilization events, it was logical that its main source was the only Greek American daily newspaper, *Ethnikos Kyrinx* (The National Herald). It was published daily in Greek with Sunday English edition and had nationwide reporting.¹ This historic newspaper was first published in 1915. At the time of the invasion in July 1974, its publisher was Babis Marketos. He was succeeded in 1976 by the AHI President, Eugene Rossides, who became the new owner and publisher.² In 1979, Rossides was succeeded by Antonis Diamataris who holds this position to the present. On May 22, 2015, with Diamataris at the helm, *Ethnikos Kyrinx* celebrated its 100th anniversary, a singular accomplishment for a Greek American newspaper and for ethnic press in America. In addition, the Chronology utilizes the 1990 AHI publication, *A Handbook on United States Relations with Greece and Cyprus* (edited and annotated by Eugene Rossides). This is an indispensable source since it covers important developments in the US, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. They are interwoven with the *National Herald's* reports to "provide the broader context on ongoing political developments."³ Contemporaneous reports in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and the *London Times* have also been utilized in the Chronology, along with the Congressional Record.

On July 15, 1974, the military junta that ruled Greece for seven years (1967-1974) and had enjoyed American support, staged a coup that overthrew the democratically elected President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. He was overthrown by the Cypriot National Guard controlled by Greek military officers, and the junta-backed EOKA-B organization that had been engaged in a campaign of subversion against the Cypriot President. The junta saw Makarios as a serious threat to its rule that was reaching a dead end following the Polytechnic student uprising in Athens a few months earlier, in November 1973. Five days later, on July 20, 1974, using the coup as a pretext, Turkey invaded the Cyprus.⁴ By July 23rd the Athens junta had collapsed. The veteran Greek leader, Constantinos Karamanlis, returned from his Paris exile to undertake the task of restoring democratic rule.

When Turkey launched a combined amphibious and airborne assault on the island republic, the fight could not have been more uneven. In terms of territory, Cyprus

occupies 3,572 square miles compared to Turkey's 301,382. Cyprus' population in 1974 was 640,700 compared to Turkey's 39 million. With the second largest army in NATO, Turkey enjoyed overwhelming military superiority over the 10,000-strong Cypriot National Guard that was deeply fractured by the coup against Makarios, but was still able to put up fierce resistance. The Greek military regime, completing its betrayal, abandoned Cyprus to its fate. The invasion, ordered by Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, took place in two stages. The first stage commenced on July 20, 1974, when Turkish troops landed near Kyrenia and captured 8% of Cypriot territory in less than a week. The second stage took place on August 14, 1974. In a pincer movement, and in less than 24 hours, 30,000 Turkish troops, backed by M-47 and M-48 tanks transported by landing crafts, with air support by F-4 Phantom fighter jets, occupied an additional 28.2% (total 36.2%) of the island bringing about the de facto partition of the Cyprus Republic. (Chronology: Aug. 14-16). All the arms used during the invasion had been supplied through US military aid. As the invasion unfolded, the Turkish army embarked on the systematic eradication of Greek presence in the northern part of Cyprus, forcing over 180,000 Greek Cypriots (36.1% of the Greek population) to leave their ancestral homes and become refugees; 4,000 were killed, while 1,619 went missing. In economic terms, Turkey placed 70% of the island's economic resources under its control. (Chronology: Aug. 14, 1974). In September 1974, while the Turkish army was consolidating its occupation, Ankara proceeded in implementing a methodical policy of colonization of the newly conquered land.

The Cyprus crisis unfolded at a time when the Watergate crisis in Washington was reaching its climax. (Chronology: July 20-24, 1975). With the Nixon presidency collapsing, Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, assumed de facto presidential authority and had the ultimate responsibility for all major foreign policy decisions including those pertaining to the Cyprus crisis.⁵ On August 8, 1974 President Nixon resigned and Vice President Gerald Ford became President. He repeatedly expressed great admiration for Kissinger whom he kept as Secretary of State.

The Introduction

The Introduction provides the necessary background that helps the reader make better sense of the Chronology. It does so by placing the events engendering the mobilization in the context of community dynamics on the one hand and Washington's political dynamics on the other. The Greek American community is not monolithic, something that also characterizes other diaspora communities. They are usually divided by factors such as "class interests, political and religious affiliations, and longevity of residence in their 'host' country. By and large, this applies to the Greek community as well. The question of longevity of residence is particularly relevant to the Greek American community. The mass migration of Greeks to the US started in the 1890s. Over

a century later, the community had entered the fourth generation. By 1930 there were half a million Greeks in the US and the core of the community had been formed by then. By that time, the assimilation process had become visible. It was part of a defensive strategy in response to anti-Greek) sentiment in the South and the mid-West. The last wave of mass migration took place between 1968 and 1979 when 122,000 Greeks immigrated to America. Since that time, Greek immigration almost ceased. The most recent Greek American population estimates based on the 2011 census that Greek Americans number 1.4 million or 0.4% of US population. Greek Americans rank as the thirty-second largest ethnicity representing a rather small ethnic community. The generational changes, combined with intermarriage, class interest, and political affiliations contribute, among others, to the community's diversity.

By the 1960s, and certainly by the early 1970s, Greek Americans had been integrated into America's social fabric. Already, the majority were American-born and had entered the ranks of the middle class, resulting in increasing suburbanization. In addition, there was a substantial number of immigrants on the path of upward social mobility. Yet, while Greek Americans were well integrated into the mainstream, they were still reluctant to become involved in activities that might have necessitated criticism of their government. Overall, there was a tendency to emphasize the importance of being and *appearing* as "loyal" Americans. In turn, this reinforced the fear of the "dual loyalty" label. A contributing factor to the community's limited political role has been the "tribal" feuds among community organizations, national and local, usually over turf and funding. Furthermore, political cleavages had developed periodically within the community. They owed their genesis to Greece that experienced several bitter divisions in the course of the twentieth century. These divisions were transferred across the Atlantic and created fissures in the Greek community. The last such division was caused by the seven-year Greek dictatorship (April 1967-July 1974) that brought about a deep split in the community. A substantial part the traditional leadership was supportive to the junta, but there was a highly vocal minority that rose in opposition.⁶

The fear of the "dual loyalty" charge, combined with internal feuds over turf and the periodical political infighting, tended to divert the community's attention away from the American political arena and the pressing national issues. This resulted in introspection that constrained the community's active involvement in the American political process and limited its ability to exercise influence in Washington. In the meantime, a new generation of Greek Americans was emerging along with new leaders. Most importantly, despite its internal tensions and divisions, the community as a whole was able to maintain its social cohesion and continued on the path of upward social mobility. The community's political landscape underwent a transformation in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Second generation Greek Americans along with the immigrant generation, mobilized as a *community* and

forcefully entered the political process. To do so, they had to leave their comfort zone since they were a group that never before challenged the policies of their government. Nonetheless, this rather timid community found the inner strength and took a public stand in opposition to government policies.

On August 18, 1974, a mass protest rally took place outside the White House. Tens of thousands of Greek Americans assembled in solidarity to torment Cyprus, protesting the Ford-Kissinger policies in the strongest terms possible. The same day, the annual convention of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) commenced in Boston. Thousands of delegates from all over the country came together in anguish. Constantine Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, sent an inspiring message to the AHEPA delegates that included the following: "You are a valuable part of Hellenism. How the Cyprus tragedy will end and how democracy will be consolidated in Greece depends on your pride in your Greek heritage." It was message that touched the Greek American psyche. By invoking the common Greek heritage and the bonds of Hellenism, Karamanlis was calling on Greek Americans to take action for Cyprus. Energized by the shared Hellenic heritage, they mobilized and took to the streets of New York and Washington, and cities around the country including Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Atlanta, Miami, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Dallas, St. Louis, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. The Greek American mayors or Syracuse and Harford, Lee Alexander George Athanson respectively, emerged as national figures in the mobilization effort. (Chronology: Aug. 1, 21, 25; Sept. 5; Oct. 2, 9; Nov. 22, 1974; Oct. 6; Nov. 29, 1976; Apr. 18; Oct. 29, 1977; June 14; 1978). Never before in the history of the Greek American community so many mass protests took place in so many urban centers around the country. This holds true for Canada as well with mass rallies taking place in Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and other cities.

Like other Americans, Greek Americans were exercising their constitutional right to peacefully protest government policies seen as unjust. They were asserting their First Amendment right that guarantees "...the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." In this case, fueling the Greek community's grievances was the unjust policy of their government led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In 1977, the *New York Times* published *The Wrong Horse*, by Lawrence Stern, a recipient of the George Polk Award.⁷ The front cover notes: "The *Washington Post's* National Editor examines how obsolete cold war policies and Henry Kissinger's 'Realpolitik' contributed to crises in Greece and Cyprus and their tragic aftermath." Apropos, chapter 19 is entitled, "Tilt to Turkey." Overall, Stern's book provides a well-documented account of Kissinger's responsibility for the Cyprus tragedy. (Chronology: Aug. 19, 1974; July 15, 1975; Dec. 10, 1977; Jan. 1, 1978; Feb. 13, 1978; also *NYT Book Review*, Feb. 12, VII, 7). As Secretary of State, Kissinger tilted American policy towards Turkey and ultimately allowed the invasion-- especially the second phase --to

take place. By doing so, the American government condoned the violation of the rule of law. American law prohibits the use of US supplied arms for aggressive purposes. As a result, the Greek American community, not only was outraged by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but had legitimate grievances with regard to their government's policies that were oblivious to the violation of American law by an ally, Turkey. While these grievances and the sense of injustice injected great passion leading to spontaneous protests, this was not sufficient to result in effective action in Washington.⁸

The American constitution provides for the separation of powers delegating Congress co-equal power with the Executive branch. As a result, lobbying became an integral part of the political process for both domestic matters and foreign policy.⁹ Ethnic politics have a long history in America. One aspect has been to appeal to the ethnic vote. The other and often related aspect, has been the political activism by ethnic groups aiming at influencing US foreign policy.¹⁰ It is common for politicians to appeal to the ethnic vote during congressional and presidential elections. When it comes to the role of ethnic lobbies in foreign policy, one can refer to the "Jewish lobby," the "Greek lobby," the "Armenian lobby," the "Irish lobby," the "Polish lobby," the "Cuban lobby," the "Albanian lobby," and more lately to the "Indian lobby," to name but a few. Ethnic lobbies, though, have been subject to accusations of "dual loyalty." As the authors put it: "Ironically, when ethnic group interests coincided with US policy, the Administration sought their support and engagement. However, when policy positions diverged, government officials eagerly criticized ethnic groups for promoting 'parochial' and 'ethnic' interests rather than the national interest."¹¹ Kissinger did not appear to mind that many Greek Americans acting as an ethnic group, supported his pro-junta policies. Yet, he was highly indignant when the Greek community mobilized against his policies in the summer of 1974. He saw in this mobilization "narrow ethnic politics" negatively affecting the "national interest" of the United States. He adopted a similar attitude towards the Jewish community. He was content when it expressed support for his Middle Eastern policies but indignant when Jewish Americans were critical of several of his policies, including his handling of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.¹² That is where the banner of the "Rule of Law" performed a crucial role for Greek American lobbying in the summer of 1974 and thereafter. Coufoudakis and Hadji argue convincingly in the Introduction that this banner, representing American values par excellence, help blunt the "unconscionable yet predictable accusations of dual loyalty."¹³ The "Rule of Law" banner channeled the spontaneous protests of the community into meaningful political action as it "provided direction and marshalled the Community."¹⁴ In all, the Introduction serves as a "guide" for reading the Chronology. It places in context the mobilization and the sequence of events that led to the imposition of the embargo in October 1974 and its subsequent lifting by the Carter administration in August 1978.

Chronology of a Nationwide Mobilization

The Chronology, that constitutes the bulk of the book, was an arduous task to compile with many pertinent events taking place the same day, at different places, with different actors and at different levels. Events were taking place simultaneously in Washington and New York as well as in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The Greek American community found itself in the midst of a series of complex, dramatic and fast-moving events to which it had to react. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus posed a great challenge to the community “creating a crisis of conscience.” In reality it was an existential crisis for the community in terms of its role in American society. The dilemma was: Remain a “loyal” ethnic community that had entered America’s mainstream and stayed introspective, while its influence on national affairs, with rare exceptions, remained marginal (US role in the Eastern Mediterranean was a national affair). Or enter the political arena and become an actor in these affairs. A community that never before mobilized to oppose the policies of its government rose to the challenge and entered forcefully the political scene.

By the summer of 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus, the community already stood upon a strong institutional base. There was a plethora of community organizations that had a defined mission, longevity and continuity. They represented the traditional institutions that included the Greek Orthodox Church, AHEPA, the Greek American Progressive Association (GAPA) weak as it was, fraternal federations, local associations, and professional and cultural associations. The leadership role of the community was assumed by the existing institutions and organizations at the national and local levels. From the outset, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese under Archbishop Iakovos, AHEPA, GAPA, the federations and regional and local associations including the Hellenic American Neighborhood Action Committee (HANAC), embarked upon the urgent task to mobilize the community. The federations had local chapters organized along the lines of Greek regional roots.¹⁵ They included the Cyprus, Chian and Sterea Ellas Federations, the Pan-Epirotan, the Pan-Cretan, the Pan-Macedonian, the Pan-Lakonian, the Pan-Messinian, the Pan-Arcadian, the Pan-Pontian, and the Federation of Hellenic Societies of Greater New York, the umbrella organization of the area associations. Under the umbrella of the federations were the regional and local associations (*topica somateia*) such as those of Cephalonians, Chians, Cretans, Cassians, Cypriots, Evrytians, Ikarians, Kalymnians, Karpathians Kastellorizians, Lemnians, Mytilinians, Nysyrians, Rhodians, Samians, Spetsans, Arcadians, Laconians, Messinians, Elians, Kalavrytians, Korinthians, Aetoloakarnanians, Nafpaktians, Athenians, Thessalians, Magnesians, Epirotans, Kastorians, Thessalonikians, Macedonians and Thracians. Many federations and local associations as well as Greek American professional organizations, were based in Astoria that had the largest concentration of Greeks in the US. The urgency for collective action, prompted the eighteen Chian associations in the New York area to merge into the Chian

Federation. Ship-owner George Livanos, who emerged as an important figure in the mobilization, was elected President and Christos Stratakis Legal Counsel. (Chronology: Aug. 2, 1974; Jan.30; July 4; Oct. 6, 1976; May 11; Nov. 16, 1977; May 26; 1978). Illustrations: p. 431).

On July, 22, 1974, as the Turkish invasion was in progress, Archbishop Iakovos, called for a rally outside the UN in order to express “our obligation to protest to the Nixon Administration, Kissinger, our Senators and Representatives.” (Chronology, July 22, 1974). The next day, the Archbishop sent telegrams to President Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger and Pope Paul VI in protest of the “unjust attack against the Greek people of Cyprus.” Iakovos, who exhibited leadership, “had distinguished himself in the civil rights movement...and had marched courageously with Martin Luther King in Selma.” (Chronology: July 22, 1974). Subsequently, the Pan-Epirotan Federation and AHEPA brought together federations and local associations at mobilization meetings at the Waldorf Astoria and Statler Hilton on July 24th and 25th respectively. (Chronology: July 24, 28, 1974). On July 30, 1974, Archbishop Iakovos convened and presided over an omnibus meeting of all the organizations at New York’s St. Moritz Hotel. The Greek Orthodox parishes found in every state were to serve as rallying points. (Chronology: July, 23-31, 1974).

The traditional leadership, the Archdiocese with its parishes in every state, AHEPA with its network of 700 chapters nationwide, the federations with their affiliated regional and local associations (*topica somateia*), were essential to the mobilization process. In a matter of few weeks, they took initiatives that contributed to the creation of a national network that mobilized Greek Americans. (Introduction: pages 9-10; Chronology: July 21-31; Aug. 1-31; Sept. 1-30, 1974). Their contribution was monumental. As it transpired, however, the nature and magnitude of the challenge required a new type of leadership and a different political action to organize the communities. As a consequence, a new dynamic developed in the Greek American community. The new leadership’s mission was to create the organizational structures necessary to perform a political role in Washington above all. It revolved around the establishment of a professional lobbying organization, the creation of new networks and the implanting of new political skills and modus operandi in order to navigate the complex landscape at the nation’s power center. Furthermore, it was essential to operate under a banner with broader appeal, such as the “Rule of Law.” These were the prerequisites in order become an effective lobby in Washington. That was a field where the traditional leadership and the structure of national community organizations were not adequately familiar. At the same time, the traditional organizations had the human and material resources at their disposal that were indispensable for the mobilization to be sustained.

Considering that the focus of the mobilization was the US Congress, it was imperative to generate Congressional initiatives with regard to Cyprus, and Turkey. Leadership for this task was provided by a new generation of Greek American leaders in Congress. It was accompanied by new political formations to fill the vacuum. In the House, these initiatives were assumed by its Greek American members, John Brademas, (D-IN), Chief Deputy Majority Whip, Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Peter Kyros (D-MN), Gus Yatron (D-PA) and Louis Bafalis R-FL). Primarily through their initiatives, they were able to build a bipartisan coalition that led to the imposition of the embargo. The leadership of Brademas and Sarbanes in the House, and Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) in the Senate, was instrumental in every respect.¹⁶

The effectiveness of Congressional leaders was facilitated by the establishment of the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) on August 1, 1974. (Chronology: Aug. 1, 1974). Its founder was Eugene T. Rossides. He served at AHI's helm as President for thirty-five years until he was succeeded by its Executive Director, Nick Larigakis. Rossides, a Columbia University football star, was a Republican political leader. He was experienced in election campaigns and was familiar with the Congressional process. He represented the first Greek American "to go through a US Senate confirmation hearing in being appointed as an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Nixon Administration."¹⁷ He was, in addition, senior partner of Rogers and Wells, a prestigious law firm headed by the former Secretary of State William Rogers. Process and timing, from Committee hearings to voting, are essential for Congressional legislation. This demands expert leadership and prompt actions by a lobbying organization in order to navigate Capitol Hill where coalition building is most critical for success. The existing vacuum in Washington came to be filled by AHI under Rossides' forceful leadership. He was called to testify repeatedly before Congressional Committees with regard to Cyprus and the embargo. In early 1975, AHI established the American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee (AHIPAC) to focus on lobbying. Like AHI, AHIPAC was modelled along the lines of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). (Chronology: Aug. 1, 1974; Illustration: p. 102). On July 14, 1975, *Time* magazine had a major article on Greek American lobbying in Washington and AHI's leading role under Eugene Rossides. (Chronology: July 14, 1975). Besides AHI, the Free Cyprus Coalition was also formed in Washington. The effort to influence Congress was strengthened by Greek Americans who served as top aides to members of Congress. Congressional staffers play a crucial role in the legislative process. Peter Marudas was top aide to Congressman (later Senator) Paul Sarbanes; (Chronology: Aug. 1, 1974, July 20, 1975); James Pyrros served as top aide to Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-MI)¹⁸ and Andy Manatos was aide to Senator Thomas Eagleton. (Chronology: Nov. 14, 17, 1974).

In New York, the epicenter of the mobilization, a group of Greek American professionals, including Serge Hadji, Ted Deliyannides, Steve Hartofilis, and Petros

Sgouromitis, founded the Panhellenic Committee, in late July 1974. (Chronology, Aug, 12, 1974). Through Greek radio programs in New York, the Panhellenic Committee called for protests outside the UN and for telegrams to be sent to members of Congress. Radio programs such as those of Aphrodite Athas, Mike Paralikas, Tina Santorineou, Jessy Stella and Mike Zapitis, served as critical mobilization vehicle since speedy action was of essence. A similar role was performed by Greek radio programs across the country. (Introduction, pages 9-10; Chronology, Aug. 12-16, 1974; Nov. 5, 1977; July 12, 1978). The Panhellenic Committed networked with AHI in Washington which was in direct contact with members of Congress. It urgently began planning a National March (*Poreia*) in Washington for August 18, 1974.

The mobilization was greatly benefited by the activism of Greek American academics. A prime example was the full-page ad placed in the Sunday edition of the *New York Times* on September 8, 1974, the day of the second Washington rally. It was a petition protesting the Ford-Kissinger policies and called for cutting off aid to Turkey. It was signed by four hundred prominent Greek American academics and professionals. (Chronology, Sept. 15, 1974; Illustrations, p. 410). They worked together with students at their respective universities and research institutions and embarked upon educating the academic community. In the New York area, the Greek Universities Graduates Association, led by Ted Deliyannides, and Steve Hartofilis, engaged in the mobilization of the academic and professional communities. Working closely with Greek students, they organized seminars and lectures, rallies, fundraisers and letter writing to members of Congress. (Chronology, Aug. 12, 13; Mar. 17; Dec. 8, 1975; Mar. 22; Nov. 3, 1977). A network of political scientists that included Professors, Van Coufoudakis, Harry Psomiades, Adamantia Polis, Ted Couloumbis, and Tellos Kyriakides, testified at Congressional hearings, met with members of Congress and engaged in lecture tours. (Chronology, Aug. 15, 1974; May 1, 29; Sept. 24; Oct. 3; Nov. 3, 6, 1977; Sept. 10, 26, 1978).

The Rule of Law Lobby's contribution to the better understanding of the phenomenon of Greek American mobilization is enhanced by demonstrating the extent of this mobilization beyond the New York and Washington areas. The Chronology accomplishes this by illustrating its nationwide scope. In a matter of weeks after the invasion, new political groupings emerged and regional and ad hoc committees were formed at the state and local levels. Most of the ad hoc committees came to be called "Justice for Cyprus Committee (s)," (JCC), usually revolving around local parishes.¹⁹ In this regard, the Chronology chronicles a plethora of mobilization activities that included: Aug. 19, 1974: Chicago. Large demonstration (over 10,000) protesting President Ford's visit. Aug. 21, 1974: Miami. Large demonstration outside the hotel where Kissinger was addressing the American Legion Convention. Aug. 30, 1974 (entry of Sept. 11, 1974): Boston. The Greek Orthodox Clergy of New England decided that every clergyman would contribute a week's salary for Cyprus and that every parishioner would contribute

a day's earning. September 6, 1974: St. Louis, the founder of the local JCC, Dr. Nikolaos Matsakis, Rev. Geranios and Mr. Koukoulis, formed the Cyprus Relief Fund, engaged in fundraising and sponsored a weekly blood drive at St. Nicholas. Oct. 11, 1974: Poughkeepsie, NY. Eleven students of *Koimisis tis Theodokou* (Dormition of Virgin Mary), Sunday School, aged 10-15, took part in a 20-mile walkathon for Cyprus. Oct. 13, 1974: Detroit. A group hailing from Florina, Greece, founded the Alexander the Great Association and raised \$1,000 for Cyprus in ten minutes. Oct. 13, 1974: Yankton, South Dakota. Ioannis Kazos mobilized the community and sent protest telegrams to Washington. Oct. 14, 1974: In San Francisco, the GAPA Chapter sent 450 packages of clothes to Cyprus. Oct. 20, 1974: Portland, Maine. The Northern Epirotes Association met at Antonis Notis residence and donated \$2,000 for Cyprus. Nov. 3, 1974: Mattituck, Long Island, NY. Evdomi Antonopoulou, held a "bingo party" at her home and raised \$130 for the refugees of Cyprus. Nov. 18, 1974: Columbia, Ohio. The Aegean Diner offered its facilities for the ongoing fundraising for Cyprus. Nov. 22, 1974: Detroit. At Raleigh House, a fundraiser is held for Cyprus. Attended by Representatives Paul Sarbanes, Lucien Nedzi and L. Esch. \$30,000 was collected for Cyprus. Feb. 12, 1975: Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada. The St. Paul community of Regina raised \$15,000 for Cypriot refugees. Sept. 7, 1975: Vancouver, Canada. The local Cyprus Committee "adopts" 200 Cyprus refugee children and engages in PR campaign for Cyprus through the local media. May 11, 1978: Milwaukee, Wisconsin. AHEPA Chapter holds fundraising for Cyprus' refugee children. July 20, 1978: San Francisco. Thousands stage a rally outside City Hall protesting Carter's plan to lift the embargo. July 24-28, 1978: Chicago. Telly Savalas, the Greek American film and TV superstar: TV spokesman for the Cyprus Children's Fund, continues his half-hour daily programs on WBBM & CBS.

All these activities, a small sample of the total, demonstrate the scope and depth of the mobilization. It was grass roots based, it extended across the vast nation, and was multifaceted in character. This was a reflection of an authentic movement that cut across classes and generations transcended political parties and ideologies and succeeded in bringing together: First, second and third generations; young and old; men, women, and children; clergy and laity; small business owners, from Diners and mom and pop stores to wealthy businessmen; professionals, academics, students, artists and workers; Democrats and Republicans; leftist Greek immigrants and traditional church goers. It is precisely the fact that this movement represented the widest cross section of the Greek American community that gave it such scope and depth. Out of this dynamic, new formations and leadership emerged. This **was** a critical reason for its political success in Washington. On its part, the traditional leadership made the necessary human and material resources at its disposal available without which the mobilization could not have been sustained. The new and the traditional leaderships working together for the common cause, managed to create the synergy required to channel the grass roots

mobilization into concrete action in Washington. This was brought about by the “Rule of Law” lobby.

The stated objective of the mobilization was to influence Congress and in this regard the Chronology in *The Rule of Law Lobby* provides a daily account of developments on Capitol Hill. At the epicenter was the impending clash between the Executive branch and Congress over the embargo. The Chronology sheds light on how the pioneers of the Greek American lobbying effort were able to navigate the complex Washington landscape with dexterity. In the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, an assertive Congress emerged as the defender of the Constitution. Framing the embargo issue as one of upholding the cardinal constitutional principle of the “rule of law,” fit well the prevailing mood in Congress. Consequently, the embargo was not viewed as just another parochial ethnic question, but one that entered the mainstream debate on how Congress could rein in potential abuses of the Executive power, with Watergate looming large in the background. In turn, this facilitated coalition building and the emergence of bipartisan action in favor of the embargo.²⁰

Holding political rallies in Washington is a standard tactic to draw Congress’ attention. Integrated into the Greek American mobilization were protest rallies around the country with the focus on Washington. On Sunday, August 18, 1974, barely four days following the second invasion, the first Greek American protest rally, known as National March (*Poreia*) was organized in the nation’s capital. The main organizers were the Panhellenic Committee working with the Free Cyprus Coalition and AHI in Washington. Women played a major role in organizing the rally. Among them were, Athanasia Gregoriadou, Effie Bozinou, Natalia Machulat, and Thaleia Bousiou. The rally took place at Lafayette Park, opposite the White House. It was an impressive gathering as tens of thousands of anguished and angry Greek Americans took part. They came from as far as Maine, Florida, Ohio and Oregon. The major slogans were “Turkey out of Cyprus” and “Cut off Military Aid to Turkey.” Posters showed President Ford and Kissinger wearing a Turkish fez. (Chronology: Aug. 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 1974; Illustrations: pp. 406-407). It was a massive rally that Congress could not ignore.

The Washington rally occurred at a time when the annual AHEPA convention was taking place in Boston (August 18-22, 1974). It was a historic gathering as thousands of Greek Americans from 700 AHEPA Chapters descended upon the liberal city at a critical juncture for the community. The atmosphere at the convention was charged and reflected the prevailing sentiment among Greek Americans. The *National Herald* described the mood as one of “anger and disgust of American Hellenes for the inaction of the US government.” Archbishop Iakovos addressed the convention along with the five Greek American members of Congress. They all called for cutting off military aid to Turkey. In his address, Congressman Brademas, declared: “What is particularly shocking is that by

action and inaction, the US government has condoned, and it is not much to say, given tacit support to Turkey's aggressive acts. It is particularly outrageous that arms used by the Turkish armed forces have been supplied by US tax payers and the troops carrying out these savage attacks have been trained with money supplied by the American people. I can tell you that the actions of US Department of State over these past 3 weeks mark the bankruptcy of US policy towards one of our oldest friends." (Chronology: Aug. 21, 23, 1974). Addressing the delegates, Congressman Sarbanes was highly critical of the State Department for condoning the invasion. He strongly denounced the use of American arms in the invasion of Cyprus and called for cutting off military aid to Turkey.

The calls for an arms embargo on Turkey were reverberating in Congress. On August 21, 1974, during a hearing on Cyprus at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, its Chairman, Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY), stated that he would support cutting off military aid to Turkey. Rosenthal emerged as one of the staunchest supporters of the embargo in Congress. (Chronology: Aug., 16; Oct. 16, 1974; Feb. 1; Oct. 2, 1976; Dec. 19, 1977; Apr. 13; Sep. 10; 1978; Illustrations: page. 433). Subsequently, on August 28, 1974, AHI President, Eugene Rossides sent a letter memorandum to the Greek American members of Congress, Brademas, Sarbanes, Cyrus, Yatron and Bafalis. In this seminal letter, Rossides presented the legal grounds for the application of the "Rule of Law" that dictated cutting off military aid to Turkey.²¹ Congressman Brademas adopted Rossides' letter, and with few changes sent it the following day (August 29) to Secretary of State Kissinger. The letter was signed by Brademas, with Sarbanes, Cyrus and Yatron co-signatories. (Chronology: Aug. 28-29, 1974). In the letter, Brademas highlighted the foreign Assistance Act of 1961 stipulating that the US military aid provided to other governments can only be used for defensive purposes. Turkey was 'in substantial violation of the provisions of the Act' since it used US supplied arms for aggressive purposes [the invasion of Cyprus]. *"Consequently, Turkey is no longer legally eligible for assistance, and proper application of the law requires the immediate halt of aid."*²² (Emphasis added). This historic letter to Henry Kissinger represented a watershed for the mobilization effort. "It laid out the 'Rule of Law' position and helped focus advocacy and grass roots support coalescing the Greek Americans and Congress." (Chronology: Aug. 28, 1974).

From then on, the drive to cut off military aid to Turkey gained momentum and became unstoppable. The mobilization intensified as Congress was starting hearings on an embargo resolution. With this in mind, on September 8, 1974, a second rally was organized by the Panhellenic Committee, AHI and the Free Cyprus Coalition in Washington. Many thousands of demonstrators from Texas to California, assembled at Lafayette Park, opposite the White House. There were slogans such as "Turkey out of Cyprus," "Rule of Law" and "Cut off Military Aid to Turkey." (Chronology: Sept. 5, 8, 10, 1974; Illustrations" pp. 408-409). As Congress was preparing to vote, the Panhellenic

Committee and other organizations, multiplied their efforts. The Committee ran ads in the *National Herald* listing the telephone numbers of all members of Congress and urging Greek Americans to contact them. (Illustrations: pp. 412-413).

Soon after the Washington rally, on September 19, 1974, the Senate debated a non-binding resolution, the "Eagleton Amendment," imposing an Arms Embargo on Turkey. The senator for Missouri forcefully led the pro-embargo forces. He was aided by Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) and Claiborne Pell (D-RI). They were joined by Republican Senators, Bob Dole (R-KS), Jacob Javits (R-NY), Charles Percy (R-IL) and Edward Brooke (R-MA). The Senate voted overwhelmingly 64 to 27 in favor of the Amendment. (Chronology: Sept. 19, 1974). The House followed suit. On September 24, 1974, voting in a stunning 307-90 majority in favor of the "Rosenthal Amendment" imposing an arms embargo on Turkey. Among the Democrats, Brademas and Sarbanes led the fight. They were joined by Republicans Edward Derwinski, and Pierre DuPont. (Chronology: Sept. 24, 25, 1974). The day before the House vote, AHEPA placed a full-page ad in the *New York Times* titled: United States Must Stop Illegal Aid to Turkey Now. (Illustrations: p. 411). On September 30, 1974, the Senate re-affirmed the arms embargo by a vote 57-20. (Chronology: Sept. 20, 1974). The House followed suit and on October 7th, voted by 291 to 69 to uphold the embargo. The next day, the Senate voted 62 to 16 to do the same. (Chronology: Oct. 8-9, 1974). What was most remarkable in the series of votes was the overwhelming pro-embargo majorities in both Houses. This was primarily achieved due to the appeal the "Rule of Law" exerted on members of Congress. It enabled the nation's lawmakers to transcend other considerations such as the "Soviet threat," and served as catalyst for coalition building.²³ The potency of the "Rule of Law" was amply expressed in an October 13, 1974 editorial strongly critical of President Ford's threat to veto the Bill imposing the embargo. The editorial concluded: "*The law is clear, Congress should stick to its guns on the military aid issue-veto on no veto.*" (Chronology, Oct. 13, 1974).

As the embargo drive was emerging victorious in Congress, one of its main architects, Senator Thomas Eagleton, felt the need to address the community through a letter published in the *National Herald* (September 30, 1974). He thanked the Greek Americans for their support adding: "Over the last few weeks, the US Senate and the other branches of the Federal Government became aware of the existence of a new political force in this country. . . A high ranking State Department official state, 'This Greek American lobby is indeed very powerful.' Your activism generated the votes at the Senate chamber and will play a significant role in the public life in our country. I thank you all for your magnificent support of my amendment for Cyprus. Sincerely yours, Thomas F. Eagleton." (Chronology: Sept. 30, 1974).

The White House was able to win a Congressional postponement of the embargo for a few months. However, on February 4, 1975, the "Rule of Law" embargo went into effect and all military aid to Turkey was cut off (Chronology: February 4, 1975). Congress dealt a serious blow to the Ford Administration and a stinging defeat to Secretary of State Kissinger. Nonetheless, throughout 1975, the Administration's exerted relentless pressure on Congress to repeal the embargo. By the Spring of 1975, another round of mobilization was in order. On the East Coast, Philip Christopher founded the Pancyprrian Athletic Association and became the architect of the Coordinating Committee of Cyprus Struggle (SEKA) and President of The International Coordinating Committee "Justice for Cyprus" known as PSEKA. (Chronology: Mar. 30; May, 6, 1975; May 15; June 17; July 14; Oct. 2, 6; Nov. 2, 6, 1977; Apr. 7, 1978). In June 1975, Andrew Athens founded in Chicago the United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC) closely linked to the Archdiocese.²⁴ On the West Coast, with California having the largest Congressional delegation in Washington, the Save Cyprus Council of Southern California (SCCSC) was instrumental in mobilizing the Los Angeles community and in lobbying members of Congress. Included in its founding board, were UCLA Professors Theodore Saloutos and Speros Vryonis. Other members included Aris Anagnos, Costas Couvaras, Peter Kaloyeras, Nikos Alexopoulos and Andreas Kyprianides, subsequently Hon. Council General of Cyprus in LA. SCCSC worked closely with its sister organization in northern California where State Senator Nick Petris, State Representative Lou Pappan, former San Francisco Mayor George Christopher, and Dr. Anastasios Simonides, joined forces in rallying the community. (Chronology: Sept. 1, 1974; May 2, 1975; Oct. 29, 1977). In Sacramento, a group led by Angelo Tsakopoulos, mobilized the community.

The White House kept up its pressure on Congress and a new House vote on the embargo was scheduled for the last week of July, 1975. It was time for the third mass rally in Washington. It took place on the US Capitol steps on Sunday, July 20, 1975. Like the previous rallies, it was organized the by the Panhellenic Committee along with the Free Cyprus Coalition and AHI in Washington. Besides commemorating the first anniversary of the Turkish invasion, the rally was meant to put pressure on Congress. An estimated crowd of 15,000 Greek Americans from 40 states, and also protesters from Canada, rallied outside the Capitol. (Chronology: July 16, 20, 22, 1975; Illustration, p. 458). The rally attracted wide media attention. On August 4, 1975, *Time* magazine published an article and a photograph of the rally with Serge Hadji on the Capitol steps reading the petition to Congress. (Illustrations: p. 424). On July 24, 1975, the House voted by a small margin, 223-206, against the Administration's proposal to lift the embargo. As American concern mounted over the status of US bases in Turkey, the House voted 237-176 to partially lift the embargo (October 2, 1975). Included in the legislation was the condition that the President had to submit to Congress a "progress report" on Cyprus every sixty days.

Notwithstanding the embargo's partial lifting, Greek Americans had scored a major political victory in Washington because against all odds, the embargo was still standing.

Carter Promises and Acts Regarding Cyprus

James (Jimmy) Earl Carter, the Democratic governor of Georgia, was elected President on November 3, 1976. He won the presidency in the aftermath of Watergate and the Nixon debacle. As it was astutely observed, he prevailed by uttering two words: *Trust me*. The American people were seeking the restoration of the moral authority of the presidency and a more ethical government. In foreign affairs, Carter's new policy was to be carried out through the support of human rights. As was the case with the majority of Americans, Greek Americans trusted Carter. Thousands attended his election rallies carrying placards against the Turkish occupation and Kissinger's policies. (Chronology: Oct. 31, 1976). On November 3, 1974, Greek Americans voted overwhelmingly for the Carter-Mondale ticket. An astounding 90% of Greek Republicans voted for Carter. The reason for this extraordinary Greek American support was Carter's and Mondale's electoral pledges with regard to Cyprus. Following a meeting with 25 Greek American leaders in Washington, candidate Carter issued the following formal statement on September 16, 1976, "The Administration failed to prevent or even limit the Turkish invasion that followed (the colonel's coup). The Administration failed to uphold even *the principle of the rule of law* in the conduct of our foreign policy. *American law requires that arms supplied by the United States be used solely for defensive purposes*. The widely reported *increase of colonization* of Cyprus by Turkish military and civilians should cease. Greek-Cypriot refugees should be allowed to return to their homes. The United States must pursue a foreign policy based on principle and in accordance with the *rule of law*." (Emphasis added) (Chronology: Sept. 16, 17, 19; Oct. 27, 1976). Similar pledges were made by Carter's running mate Senator Walter Mondale. When Carter was elected President, euphoria swept the Greek American community. Cartoons circulating as handbills depicted Carter dressed as *evzone* wearing the traditional Greek *foustanella* (kilt) and *tsarouchia* (rustic shoes). (Illustration: p. 181). Similar euphoria prevailed in Greece. In Cyprus, the day after Carter's election, bells were ringing and a national holiday was declared. School children held parades chanting in unison: *Zito o Carter, Long Live Carter*.

By May 1977, barely three months after Carter became President, he set the process of repealing the embargo in motion. A major factor to this effect, was the advice he received from Zbigniew Brzezinski who was chosen by the new President to be his National Security Adviser. Brzezinski was a highly respected Columbia scholar with expertise on Russia and the Soviet Bloc. Born in Poland, he had a deep sense of its history and its travails under imperial and communist Russia and was well versed with the centuries' old Russian-Turkish rivalry. This influenced Brzezinski's world view that was shaped by a "rigid hatred of the Soviet Union and stood to the right of many Republicans,

including Kissinger and President Nixon.”²⁵ Brzezinski shared the national security establishment’s view that Turkey was a lynchpin for NATO’s defense. The embargo was encouraging Soviet expansionism because it was weakening Turkey. It was imperative, therefore, that it be repealed.

To manage the volatile Greece-Cyprus-Turkish triangle, Brzezinski sought the expertise of Turkey expert, Paul Henze, whom he appointed as “National Security Council (NSC) Staff Officer responsible for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.” Henze was the author of *Turkey and Ataturk’s Legacy*.²⁶ It was based on his long and intimate experience with Turkey since he “traveled and lived in the country for 40 years.”²⁷ The book was a tribute to Kemal Ataturk and the new Turkey he created. A glowing foreword was written by Brzezinski. During the critical period 1974-1977, Henze served as First Secretary at the US Embassy in Ankara. In Washington, he was closely associated with Turkish foundations. All this shaped his pro-Turkish outlook that came to be combined with the negative views he held about Greece and Greek Americans. He maintained that Greece, under Karamanlis, acting “illogically, in a fit of pique [*sic*]” withdrew from NATO in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis.²⁸ Moreover, he had a caricature view of Greek Americans. He saw them as “suffering from collective neurosis [*sic*],” adding that they were motivated by “political opportunism [that] was a higher priority than the national interest.”²⁹ He was echoing the usual “dual loyalty” charge levelled against ethnic groups.

Henze was one of the key officials in the Carter’s White House who, under Brzezinski’s guidance, formulated and executed the plan to repeal the embargo. In his book he described his role, “The process [of lifting the embargo] took eight months and a great investment by the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House, including the continuous personal involvement of the President himself...I was the NSC Staff Officer in charge of Turkish affairs and involved in all decisions and actions relating to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. . .The day to day effort [for lifting the embargo] was overseen by a group consisting of State Department Counselor Matthew Nimetz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Siena, Madeleine Albright, then Brzezinski’s Assistant for Congressional Relations, and myself as NSC Staff Officer responsible for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.”³⁰ In final analysis, at the White House deliberations regarding the embargo, the President came to rely on the pro-Turkish advice of Brzezinski, and Henze. Senator Paul Tsongas considered Brzezinski the architect of repealing the embargo. (Chronology: Sept. 10, 1978). Relying on the advice of his closest aide and with the State Department’s and the Pentagon’s support, President Carter put aside human rights and took the decision to lift the embargo as realpolitik would have dictated.

On March 24, 1978, President Carter announced his decision to lift the embargo to John Brademas and other Congressional leaders. The decision to repeal the embargo was publicly announced by the White House on April 1, 1978. (Chronology: Apr. 1, 1978). It was a weekend, Saturday, when media attention usually turns away from Washington, especially when the President leaves town. As it transpired, President Carter was out of town that Saturday. He was on a state visit to Nigeria. The announcement was followed by a storm of protests in the Greek American community. As it did in the summer of 1974, the community embarked on a nationwide mobilization. In a joint Congressional statement, Senator Sarbanes accused Carter of reneging in his campaign pledge “not to lift the embargo until Turkey made concessions on a solution to the Cyprus problem.” (Chronology: Apr. 5, 1978). Eugene Rossides, AHI President and *National Herald* publisher, called on the community mobilize and “defend US interests which are the Rule of Law, Human Rights and Majority rule, and their bonds to Greece.” (Chronology: Apr. 5, 1978). In addition to the *National Herald*, a new Greek language daily, *Proini*, added its voice in rallying the community. It was founded in 1977 by Fannie Petallides, the publisher. Petros Sgouromitis, of the Panhellenic Committee, served as *Proini's* editor. Professor Basil Vlavianos, with a long history of activism in Greek causes, wrote powerful editorial columns. With Petallides at the helm, became a forceful voice for Cyprus and “was very supportive of the Community’s mobilization and the ‘Rule of Law’ movement.” (Chronology: June 30, 1976; Dec. 31, 1977; Apr. 16, 24, 1978; Illustrations: pp. 436, 437, 442).

The announcement for lifting the embargo led to frantic preparations in New York for the fourth National March (*Poreia*) in Washington mid-April. It was to be led by Archbishop Iakovos (Chronology: Apr. 9, 1978). The protest rally, organized by the Panhellenic Committee, AHI and the Free Cyprus Coalition in Washington, took place on Sunday, April 16, 1978 at Lafayette Park. An estimated 10-15,000 protestors took part. They carried placards that included: “Keep the Arms Embargo on Turkey” and “President Carter: Human Rights? Look at Cyprus.” (Chronology: Apr. 17, 1978; Illustrations: pp. 320, 342). The speakers included Archbishop Iakovos, Senators Sarbanes and Eagleton, Congressmen Brademas, Rosenthal and Biaggi, AHEPA Supreme President Derzis, and Serge Hadji, who wrote and read the protest petition approved by acclamation. (Chronology: April, 16, 17, 1978; Photograph in Illustrations: pp. 442; Copy of petition, Illustrations; p. 443). Once more, Greek Americans made their presence known to Washington demonstrative their ability to engage in massive mobilization.

Throughout April, the Carter administration was engaged in preparations for the looming embargo fight in Congress. Subsequently, the White House produced two memoranda. The first was issued on May 17, 1978 and was directed to the President. Its authors were Frank Moore and Bob Beckel, the White House congressional liaisons. The memorandum stressed that it would be very difficult to win Congressional majorities, in

the House especially. After reading the memorandum, Carter wrote in the margins, "Frank, against these odds it will take a lot of planning and work. Let's go."³¹ Based on the May 17th memorandum, the White House produced on June 1, 1978, a presidential memorandum with an action plan aimed at Congress. The plan included a series of White House meetings with 100 members of Congress. This was to be combined by a coordinated effort by the national security bureaucracy. On June 14, 1978, President Carter gave a televised press conference. In his opening statement he asserted that lifting the embargo "is the most immediate and urgent foreign policy decision facing Congress" and would facilitate a Cyprus settlement. (Chronology: June 14, 1978). Immediately, Congressmen Brademas and Rosenthal and Senators Sarbanes and Eagleton sharply criticized the President. (Chronology: June 14, 1978).

Soon thereafter, Carter launched a direct appeal to the Greek American community. He invited over 150 prominent Greek American to the White House. Archbishop Iakovos turned down Carter's invitation.³² On June 22, 1978, the President met face to face with 150 leading Greek Americans in the East Room. Starting at 11:30 am, Carter's top aides made a presentation focusing on the Soviet threat. They were followed by President Carter who greeted warmly his Greek American guests. He proceeded with a personal appeal asking for their support in his drive to lift the embargo. Like his top aides, he stressed the Soviet threat against Turkey that had been weakened militarily by the embargo. Its repeal would help both Greece and Turkey, he argued. He closed his appeal by emphasizing that the embargo has become counterproductive and it was imperative to lift it as it will "help bring about a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem." (Chronology: June, 22, 23, 1978). The Greek American leaders were unmoved by Carter's plea. He faced their unanimous and vociferous opposition. Several of the participants told the President that when it came to Cyprus, he had not honored his pledges to the community and that he was untrustworthy. Carter was stung by these remarks and could not hide his discomfort. Following the disastrous encounter that left the President embarrassed, the Greek American leaders were invited to the Rose Garden where they were offered baklava and iced tea.

As the embargo vote in Congress was approaching, Carter's national security team mobilized the influential pro-Turkish network around the country. It included the defense industry, corporate leaders, former key government officials, academics and sympathetic media. (Introduction: p. 15; Chronology: June 28, 1977; July 10, 12, 1978). The President personally spent considerable time to build a winning Congressional coalition. The coalition included the Senate's leadership, Majority leader Robert Byrd (D-WV), Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), and Democratic Senators John Sparkman (D-AL), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and John Stennis (MS), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. The Stennis committee was central to the embargo debate. Its five key members, three Democrats and two republicans were supportive of

the embargo's lifting. The three Democrats were Senators Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, Frank Church of Idaho, and George McGovern. All three had been earlier supporters of the embargo. In the House, Steven Solarz (D-NY), and John Findley (R-IL) emerged among the strongest advocates of the embargo's repeal. For Carter to win in Congress he needed the support of southern Democrats. Employing the persuasive powers of the Presidency, he was able to secure their support. In this way, a formidable anti-embargo coalition was formed in Congress. This foreshadowed a close fight on the Hill.

The Senate vote on lifting the embargo took place on Tuesday, July 25, 1978. Up to the last minute, the President had been inviting Senators to the White House and making phone calls to wavering lawmakers. The legislation before the Senate was designated as "Amendment No. 1491—Purpose: To repeal the limited embargo on arms sales to Turkey." The sponsors of the amendment were Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and fellow Democratic Senators, George McGovern and Lloyd Bentsen; and Republican Senator John Chafee. The architect of the amendment, however, was Senator George McGovern and the amendment became known as the "McGovern amendment."³³ During the Senate debate, McGovern emerged as one of the staunchest supporters for repealing the embargo. It was a great irony that the icon of the liberal left, Senator McGovern, an earlier champion of the embargo, led the charge for its lifting. In this way, he offered "cover" to other liberals in Congress to support the embargo's repeal.

In the Senate, the opposition was led primarily by Democrats Paul Sarbanes and Thomas Eagleton who were supported by Edward Kennedy, Joe Biden, Abraham Ribicoff and Everett Durkin (D-NH). They were joined by Republican Senators, Bob Dole, Jacob Javits, Charles Percy, Paul Laxalt (R-NV), Edward Brooke (R-MA), and Pete Dominici (R-NM). On July 25, 1978, following a highly contentious debate, the Senate voted to lift the embargo by 57 to 42 votes. Thirty Democrats were joined by the great majority of Republicans, 27 in all, to repeal the embargo. On the other hand, 32 Democrats were joined by 10 Republicans to keep the embargo.

The House vote was scheduled for Tuesday, August 1, 1978. Two days before, on Sunday, UHAC President, Andrew Athens, convened an urgent meeting at Washington's St. Sophia Cathedral attended by forty community organizations from forty states. Among those taking part were Eugene Rossides, Senator Sarbanes and Congressman Derwinski. It was decided that next day, forty representatives from the attending organizations would lobby their Congressmen to uphold the embargo. (Chronology: July 28, 30, 1978).

The House vote on the embargo took place next day, Tuesday, August 1, 1978. Leading the opposition to the embargo's lifting were, John Brademas, the Majority Whip, along with Benjamin Rosenthal, Mario Biaggi, Dante Fascell, and the rising star in the Democratic Party, Paul Tsongas (D-MA). They had the support of Republicans, Edward

Derwinski, John Rhodes (R-AZ) and William Cohen, (R-MN), among others. Carter personally lobbied members of the House because, as the vote was winding down, the bill to lift the embargo was heading towards defeat by a 207 to 206 vote. The President, employing the prestige of his office, was able to prevail. In a cliffhanger vote and at the very last minute, two Congressmen, Butler Derrick (D-SC), and Richard Schulze (R-PA), switched their votes and Carter won by the thinnest of margins: 208 to 205. As was the case in the Senate, the majority of House Democrats, 141 to 130 voted to keep the embargo. But 78 Republican votes were added to 52 Democratic votes to give Carter the majority he needed. The Democratic votes included those of liberals such as Paul Simon (IL), Claude Pepper (FL), Barbara Jordan (TX), James Corman (CA), and Augustus Hawkins (CA). Their pro-embargo vote was facilitated by Senator McGovern. Being the leading liberals in Congress who led the Senate fight to repeal the embargo, he provided “cover” to other liberals. Considering the closeness of the vote, a few liberal Democrats made the difference. With the embargo lifted, and given Carter’s assurances to Congress that Turkey had been acting in good faith, it appeared that the way was open for a Cyprus settlement within a reasonable period of time. (Chronology; Sept. 26, 1978).]

Occupied Cyprus: Thirty-Nine Years Later

It did not take long for Carter’s assurances to be shattered. On November 15, 1983, with Turkey’s blessings, the Turkish Cypriot “Legislative Assembly” announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The occupied area was declared an “independent state” named “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) with the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, as “President.” Under international law the “TRNC” represents an illegal entity and is recognized only by Turkey. Nonetheless, this unilateral action solidified Cyprus’ division that was brought about by the force of Turkish arms provided through US military aid. It is important, therefore, to briefly examine what transpired in the occupied territory since the embargo’s repeal.

In the aftermath of the invasion, Turkey embarked upon two complementary policies: The cultural transformation of the occupied territory accompanied by the massive colonization by Anatolian settlers. Both policies commenced three decades before Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Islamic Oriented AKP party came to power in 2003. Since 1974, successive governments representing Turkey’s Kemalist order, have been carrying out these policies. The Chronology offers abundance of evidence regarding both the Islamization and colonization processes. From the outset, Turkey embarked upon an Islamization policy carried out under the watchful eye of the occupying Turkish armed forces. The centuries-old Greek Orthodox cultural heritage was uprooted, starting with the conversion of churches into mosques. This process was carried out in parallel to the widespread destruction and misappropriation of 550 Greek Orthodox churches, chapels

and monasteries. (Chronology: Jan. 21, 1975; Feb. 2, 1975; Apr. 18, 25, 1976; Dec. 12, 1976.)³⁴ A report to UNESCO documenting the extent of destruction was suppressed and was not made public.³⁵ Invoking the Geneva Convention, the Cyprus government protested repeatedly. By the time Erdoğan came to power in 2003, the occupied territory's Islamization had been consolidated. However, TRNC's Islamization received added impetus since Erdoğan's rise. New mosques have been built in grandiose style by the Turkish *Diyanet* (Religious) Foundation. They include the Hala Sultan Mosque and the Near East University Mosque near occupied Nicosia. The latter has seven minarets, four are 72 meters high and two reach 54 meters. These new mosques have a conspicuous architectural style to correspond to 16th century Ottoman style promoted by Erdoğan in Turkey.³⁶ At the same time, the "TRNC" has become an international center for Islamic learning. Several theological schools are linked to new universities that attract many thousands of Muslim students from around the world.³⁷

Islamization has been facilitated by the systematic and massive introduction of Anatolian settlers into the occupied territory. The Chronology includes several reports that offer insight into the colonization process. (Chronology: Sept. 29; Oct. 12, 13, 14; Nov. 7, 9, 1975; Feb. 18; Mar. 3; May 6, 12; Sept. 16, 19; Nov. 25, 1976; Nov. 3, 1977). By September 1974, Turkey had started introducing colonizers by the thousands. They settled in the emptied Greek Cypriot villages. The vast majority were Anatolian peasants and their families. They were deeply religious as their life revolved around Islamic practices, traditions and customs with the mosque becoming the epicenter of their existence.³⁸ An estimated 25,000 settlers, had arrived by the end of 1975. The massive influx of settlers generated considerable discontent among Turkish Cypriots.³⁹ Citing the Geneva Convention, the Cyprus government protested the colonization of the occupied territory. (Chronology: Oct. 14, 1975).⁴⁰

Still, the colonization, continued unabated. This prompted the Council of Europe into action. It assigned the Spanish Parliamentarian Alfonso Cuco to visit Cyprus and prepare a report. He visited the island from November 4-8, 1999. He spent time at both the government control area and the occupied territory. In April 1992, he submitted his report to the Council of Europe that adopted it. The report included well-documented evidence that the colonization in the "TRNC" was taking place on a massive scale and that the settlers were deeply religious.⁴¹ A decade later a Finnish Deputy, Jaakko Laakso, serving as the Council of Europe Rapporteur, visited Cyprus twice, May 5-12, 2001, and October 28-30, 2002. He spent time at both the government-controlled area and the "TRNC." In May 2003, the Council of Europe adopted the findings of the Laakso report.⁴² It confirmed the mass presence of settlers in the "TRNC." By 2001 they were estimated at 115,000 and constituted the majority of its population. The Turkish Cypriots were estimated at 87,000.⁴³ By the time Erdoğan rose to power, the settler population exceeded that of Turkish Cypriots by far. Based on the evidence in the Laakso report, the Council

of Europe included the following in its recommendations: “Call on Turkey, as well as its *Turkish Cypriot subordinate local administration* in northern Cyprus, to stop the process of colonization by Turkish settlers (Emphasis added).⁴⁴ The latest demographic data on Cyprus for 2015, (excluding foreign nationals residing in the government controlled area) provide the following profile: Greek Cypriots 701,000 or 88.4%, and Turkish Cypriots 91,800 or 11.6%.⁴⁵ The settler estimates vary widely since the “TRNC” does not allow an independently verified census. Estimates range from 160,000 to 250,000.⁴⁶

The Islamization process along with the massive presence of settlers, has been complemented by structural ties that organically link the “TRNC” with Turkey. Foremost is the absolute control of security and overwhelming military superiority through the presence of a 43,000-strong occupation army.⁴⁷ Then, was the total “TRNC” economic dependence on Ankara. What stands out is the enormous project of an undersea pipeline that transfers water from southern Turkey to the “TRNC.” It is the world’s longest undersea water pipeline, 49.7 miles long, at the cost of over half billion dollars. It was inaugurated by President Erdoğan on October 17, 2015.⁴⁸ Other vital links between “TRNC” and Turkey include the sectors of energy, communications, transportation, banking, trade and education. Combined, all these links form the umbilical cord that ties “TRNC” to Turkey.

The nature of politics in the “TRNC” is important because it can shed light on the extent to which its internal political processes are autonomous and not beholden to Turkey. While “TRNC” politics have the trappings of pluralism with elections and political parties, they reflect an amalgamated body politic consisting of settlers from Turkey--the great majority of the population-- and Turkish Cypriots who have been transformed to a numerical minority. Under a “law on naturalization,” a very large number of settlers has been granted “TRNC citizenship.” They are enabled to vote in elections at all levels. Settlers have been elected members of the “Legislative Assembly” and can serve as “TRNC” “ministers.” In this way they are integrated into “TRNC’s” political system while Ankara stage manages the political theater. Thus, the settlers serve as a crucial component of Turkish policies towards Cyprus. In an October 3, 2017 letter to the UN Secretary General, the government of Cyprus formally protested the fact that Turkish Cypriots “live under the complete political, military, administrative and economic control of Turkey.”⁴⁹

The cumulative effect of these developments, has relegated the “TRNC” to the status of total subservience, that of a protectorate, to a great regional power, Turkey. “TRNC’s” source of power and the source of its internal legitimacy derive from an increasingly authoritarian and Islamic oriented Turkey. As a consequence, the “TRNC government” and its political leadership, its “President” and its institutions in general are in the service of Turkey and its long-term expansionist policy in Cyprus that has

exhibited remarkable continuity. It is a policy that lately encompasses the ongoing energy-gas exploration within the exclusive economic zone of the Cyprus Republic. Ankara considers Cyprus an important geostrategic asset for its broader ambition to project a hegemonic neo-Ottoman power into the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East, a region that has become even more volatile since the Iraq war, the Arab Spring and the collapse of Syria.

In addition to contributing to the entrenchment of Cyprus' division, the embargo's repeal affected negatively US-Greek relations. Carter had stressed repeatedly that the embargo "has driven a wedge between the US and Turkey and the US and Greece." (Chronology: June 1, 1978). It is accurate that the embargo led to the deterioration of US-Turkish relations. They were restored following its lifting. The assertion, however, that the embargo had "driven a wedge between the US and Greece," was disingenuous and highly misleading because the opposite was true. On several occasions, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff, warned President Carter, Congress and top American diplomats, that the lifting of the embargo "would aid opposition leader Andreas Papandreou," known for his anti-American views, and harm Greece's relations with the US. (Chronology: Apr. 2, 1978). During a May 31, 1978 White House meeting, Karamanlis told Carter that repealing the embargo could lead to the fall of his government.⁵⁰ Two days later, on the Greek Premier was on the Hill where he gave a blunt warning to members of the House International Relations Committee: "*The lifting of the embargo could even lead to the fall of my government and my resignation.*" (Emphasis added)⁵¹

It did not take long for Karamanlis' prescient warnings to come to pass. Since he restored democracy in Greece in July 1974, the rising star in Greek politics had been Andreas Papandreou. (Chronology: Sept. 3, 12; Nov. 14, 1974; Nov. 20, 1977; April 1, 2, 11, 1978). He was perhaps the most charismatic Greek leader since the time of Eleftherios Venizelos in the 1910s and 1920s. American-trained Papandreou, founded his party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) on September 3, 1974, barely three weeks after the second round of the Turkish invasion. PASOK's manifesto was characterized by anti-Americanism revolving around US support to the Greek military junta and the condoning of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The embargo's lifting, undermined Karamanlis' pro-western government and enhanced Papandreou's popular appeal. (Chronology: November 20, 1977; April 2, 1978). In the elections held on October 19, 1981, riding a wave of anti-Americanism, Papandreou emerged triumphant and became the new Prime Minister replacing Karamanlis, a sincere friend of the United States. In this respect, as Eugene Rossides observed in his Chronology notes, the embargo's repeal favored the aggressor Turkey, distanced the US from the democratically government of Karamanlis in Greece, and was a substantial cause of Andreas Papandreou's election on an anti-American platform. (Chronology: Apr. 1, 11; June 1, 1978).

The Supremacy of the Rule of Law

Forty-three years have elapsed since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Greek American mobilization leading to the Arms Embargo on Turkey in September 1978. The embargo's repeal in August 1978, does not detract from the Greek American political success in imposing it. The Carter Administration's victory in the House was only by the closest of margins, three votes. It might have been a political victory for the President but in reality, it was a moral defeat. As the majority leader in the House, John Brademas put it: "The close margin was, given the pressure of the executive branch, a moral victory for Congressman Sarbanes, our allies and me."⁵² By extension, it was a moral victory for the Greek American mobilization against the lifting of the embargo.

In the aftermath of the mobilization and the embargo's imposition, Greek Americans came to realize that for collective political action to be effective, had to be highly organized, sustained and multifaceted. In the context of American politics, money--for better or worse--is an essential condition for a political campaign to succeed. Hence the dictum, "fundraising is the mother's milk of politics." In the mobilization process, Greek Americans learned the "art" of fundraising. The Chronology and Illustrations offer plenty of examples: (Chronology: Oct. 2, 9, 13, 1974; Sept. 1, 16; Oct. 6, 14, 22, 1978; Illustrations: pp. 16, 432-435). In every respect, therefore, the mobilization provided Greek Americans "the experiential education" necessary to become influential political actors. The mobilization enhanced communal solidarity and gave Greek Americans a sense of pride for what they had accomplished through the "Rule of Law" lobby. This injected self-confidence and encouraged a new generation of Greek Americans to enter the political arena and run for office for both parties at the state and national levels. The potential for being an influential political actor does exist since the community's socio-economic status today is better than it was in 1974.⁵³

Going through the pages of *The Rule of Law Lobby*, the reader witnesses the rise and evolution of what has been a quintessentially American lobby. Spearheaded by AHI under the banner of the rule of law, this lobby was able to influence US foreign policy with the imposition of the Congressional embargo of arms on Turkey. This is where the great value of the book is found. It accounts for the dynamics and logistics of a nationwide movement and does so by providing a day by day chronicle of the when, where, who and how of this movement. In this way, through the Chronology, the book illuminates the complex web encompassing the Greek American mobilization that engendered the "Rule of Law Lobby." Senator Sarbanes, a protagonist in all this, responded when asked about the "Greek Lobby" in Washington, "The so called 'Greek Lobby' in reality is an American lobby comprised of those who support Greek rights because they believe in American principles which are based on moral and human rights." (Chronology: Jun. 28, 1977). In this respect, Coufoudakis and Hadji offer a lesson of what happens when the

rule of law is sidestepped or violated in order to serve foreign policy expediency and realpolitik--US strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean--with Cyprus paying the price. *The Rule of Law Lobby* is very timely since the rule of law is as relevant as ever and remains the guiding principle in the Greek American community's striving for the Cyprus and Greek causes. All this is splendidly demonstrated in this seminal book on the "Rule of Law Lobby."

¹ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵ (Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1999, pp. 1187, 1191-1192).

⁶ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, p. 9.

⁷ Laurence Marcus Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (NY: Quadrangle Books, 1977).

⁸ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, p. 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁰ Charles Mathias, Jr. "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1981, pp. 975-998.

¹¹ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, p. 8.

¹² *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, page 11. Also: Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (NY: Random House, 1987), pp. 131, 192, 232-233, 236).

¹³ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, p. 8.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 10.

¹⁸ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: (Illustrations: page. 401 and, Appendix A, pp. 459-461).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Introduction: pp. 9-12.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 11; Chronology, Aug. 2.

²² *Ibid.*, copy of the letter in Appendix B, p. 462.

²³ *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 11.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Introduction: p. 10 and Chronology: July 22, 1975; Oct. 20, Nov. 8, 1976; July 28, 31, 1978).

²⁵ "Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1928-2017, A Security Adviser with Decades of Influence," *New York Times*, May 27, 2017).

²⁶ Paul Henze, *Turkey and Ataturk's Legacy*. (Haarlem, Netherlands, 1998).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.84.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 88 and 104.

³¹ The White House, Memorandum to the President. Subject: Turkish Arms Embargo, May 17, 1978.

³² *National Herald*, June 21, 1978.

³³ The McGovern amendment appears in the *Congressional Record*, Senate, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 124 – Part 15, July 21, 1978 to July 31, 1978, p. 22548.

³⁴ Cyprus Foreign Ministry: www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa16

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- ³⁵ *Guardian*, May 10, 1976.
- ³⁶ “The Second Conquest,” *New York Times Magazine*, June 18, 2017, pp. 46-53, esp. p. 5.
- ³⁷ “Students Flock to Universities in Northern Cyprus,” *New York Times*, February 16, 2014.
- ³⁸ *Guardian*, Oct. 13 &14, 1975.
- ³⁹ *Sunday New York Times*, Sept. 26, 1976.
- ⁴⁰ http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa15_en/mfa15_en.
- ⁴¹ Parliamentary Assembly, Rapporteur Mr. Alfonse Cuco. Report: “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus.” Doc. 6589, 27 April 1992.
- ⁴² Parliamentary Assembly, Rapporteur: Mr. Jaakko Laakso. Report: “Colonization by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus.” Doc. 9799, 2 May 2003.
- ⁴³ Laakso Report, II. 2. 24, p. 6; also, Republic of Cyprus, *Demographic Report 2015*, Table 17; Estimates of Total Population, 1974-2015, p. 47, November 201).
- ⁴⁴ Laakso Report, I. 7. iv. p. 3
- ⁴⁵ (Republic of Cyprus, *Demographic Report 2015*, p. 47, November 2016.
- ⁴⁶ *The Rule of Law Lobby*: Introduction, p. 13.
- ⁴⁷ Aristos Aristotelous, *The Military Forces in Cyprus 2017*, Annual Report, Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2017.
- ⁴⁸ *Euronews*, October 17, 2015.
- ⁴⁹ Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release on Turkey’s efforts to assimilate the Turkish Cypriot Community, 5 October, 2017.
- ⁵⁰ Minutes of the White House meeting on May 31, 1978: *Karamanlis Archive*, vol. 10, pp. 242-246; Chronology, May 31, 1978.
- ⁵¹ *Karamanlis Archive*, vol. 10, p. 25.
- ⁵² *The Rule of Law Lobby*, Appendix C, p. 464.
- ⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 14.